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In two studies, we analyzed the relationships between different types of self-evaluation 
(i.e., narcissism and self-esteem) and support for democracy. Support for democracy requires the 
ability to respect the views and opinions of others, even if one disagrees with them. Classic 
studies have linked support for democracy with high self-evaluation, which should assume 
psychological security and, thus, the ability to trust others. However, not all forms of high self-
evaluation are secure. Narcissists have high feelings of self-worth, but tend to be defensive: they 
are easily threatened by criticisms or conflicting views. We then expected that while support for 
democracy should be positively predicted by secure, non-narcissistic self-evaluation, it should be 
negatively predicted by narcissistic self-evaluation. In two studies, conducted in the U.S. (Study 
1, n=407) and in Poland (Study 2, n=405), support for democracy was positively predicted by 
self-esteem and negatively predicted by narcissism. Study 2 additionally demonstrated that 
interpersonal trust mediated the effects of self-esteem on support for democracy. We discuss the 
role of psychological predispositions in understanding support for democratic systems.  













My Way or the Highway:  
High Narcissism and Low Self-esteem Predict Decreased Support for Democracy 
³'HPRFUDWLFFKDUDFWHUGHYHORSV only in those who esteem thePVHOYHVHQRXJKWRHVWHHPRWKHUV´ 
(Laswell, 1962, p. 162) 
Over the last years, one of the major challenges for social scientists has been 
understanding SHRSOH¶V relationship with democracy (e.g., Moghaddam, 2016). Some argue that 
citizens are becoming increasingly ³likely to express hostile views of democracy´DQG³vote for 
anti-establishment parties and candidates that disregard long-standing democratic norms´
(Mounk & Foa, 2016, para. 2). Others have questioned these analyses, suggesting that small 
between-country and generational variations put aside, the overall trend for democratic support is 
relatively stable (Voeten, 2016). In times of a volatile political climate it might, however, be 
crucial not only to ask whether support for democracy is changing, but also to re-visit one of the 
basic lines of inquiry in the psychology of political attitudes: what predisposes people to support 
democratic principles?  
IndividualV¶ support for the democratic system is of course dependent on the social and 
political context, but it is at least partially driven by psychological characteristics (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Dahl, 1971; Lipset, 1959). In the current paper, we return to 
the classic question on whether LQGLYLGXDOV¶feelings of self-worth predict support for democracy 
(Sniderman, 1975). We argue that support for democracy should be differently associated with 
varying forms of self-evaluation: it should be positively related to secure (i.e., genuine) self-
evaluation, but negatively associated with narcissistic self-evaluation that is easily threatened by 
criticism (Konrath, Bushman, & Campbell, 2006; Stucke & Sporer, 2002). We base this 




reasoning on research highlighting the role of threat and trust in support for democratic 
principles. 
In their extensive review of psychological underpinnings of democracy, Sullivan and 
Transue (1999) argue WKDWVXSSRUWIRUGHPRFUDF\GHSHQGVRQSHRSOHV¶ZLllingness to participate 
in politics and, especially, on their tolerance of RWKHUV¶efforts to do so. This requires individuals 
to have faith in the political opposition, who might promote views that do not support their own 
convictions or broader societal norms. Sniderman (1975) suggested that support for democracy 
should then be associated with psychological security which promotes an ability to respect the 
views and opinions of others, even if one disagrees with them. In line with this logic, personality 
research has shown that those in favor of democratic values are considerate of people with 
dissimilar opinions, and psychologically secure in admitting that they could hold incorrect 
information²at least when compared to their non-democratic counterparts (Hooghe & 
Wilkenfeld, 2008; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Uslaner, 1999). At the same time, individuals who are 
unable or unwilling to alter their opinions for the sake of compromise may be more easily 
threatened by political heterogeneity and, hence, come to contest democratic norms that attempt 
to accommodate diverse sets of opinions (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Thus, both chronic 
defensiveness and induced perceptions of threat can contribute to decreased support for 
democracy (e.g., Hastings & Shaffer, 2005; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; 
Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981) as well as increased support for alternatives to 
democracy, for instance strong authoritarian leadership (e.g., Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; 
Landau et al., 2004).  
One of the crucial factors shaping psychological defensiveness versus security is the 
FRQYLFWLRQDERXWRQH¶V self-worth. Lane (1962) argued that ³the democratic machinery can be 




operated only by men who estimate their own worth, as well as the worth of others, as 
VLJQLILFDQWO\KLJKS´In line with this reasoning, Sniderman (1975) would later find that 
high self-esteem was indeed related to support for democratic principles, alongside political 
engagement and political knowledge. In a similar vein, Sullivan and colleagues (1981) evaluated 
the impact of personality factors contributing to political tolerance and found that high-self-
esteem ZKLFKWKH\FRQVLGHUHGDPDUNHURI³SV\FKRORJLFDOVHFXULW\´, was positively associated 
with political tolerance and general support for democratic norms. These studies suggest that 
high self-evaluation should result in support for democracy.  
However, more recent studies, conducted in the U.S. (Shaffer & Hastings, 2004) and 
Finland (Miklikowska, 2012), did not find significant correlations between support for 
democratic values and self-esteem. We propose that past research on the link between self-
evaluation and support for democracy might have resulted in inconsistent findings because high 
self-evaluation may take different forms which are not always secure. Research on self-
evaluation often distinguishes between high secure self-esteem and narcissism (e.g., Cichocka, 
Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, 2016; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017; Locke, 2009; Paulhus, 
Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004; Stronge, Cichocka, & Sibley, 2016).  
Narcissism assumes positive feelings of self-worth but is considered defensive, rather 
than secure. It is an excessive self-evaluation associated with feelings of entitlement and self-
importance (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Horvath & Morf, 2009; Krizan & Herlache, 2018). 
Narcissists believe themselves to be unique and superior to others (Campbell, Rudich, & 
Sedikides, 2002). They tend to support social hierarchies, especially if they feel they can be on 
top of the pecking order (Zitek & Jordan, 2016; see also Cichocka, Dhont, & Makwana, 2017). 
At the same time, they are exhibitionistic and constantly look for external validation (Baumeister 




& Vohs, 2001; ByrQH	2¶%ULHQ0RUI	5KRGHZDOWReynolds & Lejuez, 2011). 
They also have a tendency WRSHUFHLYHRWKHUV¶DFWLRQVDV intentionally malicious (Cichocka et al., 
2016). Overall, narcissists are hostile to people who undermine their infallibility and are easily 
threatened by opinions inconsistent with their own (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Horvath 
& Morf, 2009; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989). Therefore, we predicted that due to their 
increased sensitivity to threats stemming from criticism or disagreement (e.g., Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998; Horton & Sedikides, 2009; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993), narcissists should be 
less enthusiastic about democracy, which inherently assumes the need to respect different 
ideologies and opinions.  
Thus, support for democracy should only be associated with high self-evaluation to the 
extent that this self-evaluation is well-anchored and not easily undermined by others. Such 
confidence is characteristic of secure self-evaluation (also sometimes called mature, genuine or 
optimal self-evaluation)²that is, self-esteem without the defensive component captured by 
narcissism (Horney, 1939; Kernis, 2003; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017; Paulhus, et al., 2004). 
Secure self-evaluation captures unassuming pride in the self without the need for external 
validation (Locke, 2009; Cichocka et al., 2017; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017) and serves as a 
buffer against psychological threats (Paulhus et al., 2004). Secure self-evaluation is also 
associated with general positive attitudes toward other people (Cichocka et al., 2016) and, as 
such, is likely to foster the ability and willingness to trust them. Thus, we assumed that only high 
non-narcissistic self-evaluation should predict support for democracy. One mediator of this link 
could be interpersonal trust. 
Interpersonal trust is a key precondition for political tolerance and support for democracy 
(Gibson, 1992; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Those who do not trust others are unlikely to respect 




their right to govern or influence the political system. Indeed, research has shown positive links 
between general interpersonal trust and support for democratic values (Almond & Verba, 1963; 
Miklikowska, 2012; Verba, 1961). For example, Sullivan and colleagues (1981) found that 
trusting individuals were more tolerant of those holding contrasting political attitudes and 
positions. Similarly, Inglehart (1997) argued that levels of interpersonal trust can contribute to 
the existence and stability of democratic regimes (see also Sullivan & Transue, 1999). In line 
with these results, Almond and Verba (1963) linked interpersonal trust, associated with high self-
evaluation and sense of security, to democratic participation. Also, Sullivan and colleagues 
(1981) found that trusting individuals were more tolerant of those holding contrasting political 
attitudes and positions.  
Past research indicated that trust is also associated with feelings of self-worth. Those with 
high self-esteem are more likely to trust others (e.g., Cicero & Kerns, 2011; Stimpson, & 
Maughan, 1978) and less likely to SHUFHLYHRWKHUV¶DFWLRQVDVLQWHQWLRQDOO\PDOLFLRXV (Cichocka 
et al., 2016). Narcissism, on the other hand, is associated with higher distrust (e.g., Back et al., 
2013; Miller & Maples, 2011; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Therefore, we 
predicted that interpersonal trust could at least partially account for the associations between 
narcissism versus self-esteem and support for democracy. 
Overview of the Current Research 
In two studies, we examined the relationships between different types of self-evaluation 
(i.e., narcissism and self-esteem) and support for democracy. We assumed that support for 
democracy should be positively predicted by self-esteem, but negatively by narcissism. In Study 
1, conducted in the U.S., we examined the basic relationships between self-esteem, narcissism 
and democratic support. In Study 2 we sought to replicate the results of Study 1 in a different 




social-political context. We collected data from a post-Communist country, Poland, which tends 
to score lower in the levels of democratization (The Economist Intelligence Unit; EIU, 2016) and 
where general support for the political system tends to be lower than in Western democracies 
(Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Cichocka, Winiewski, Bilewicz, Bukowski, & Jost, 2015; cf. Baryla, 
Wojciszke, & Cichocka, 2015). Study 2 further investigated whether interpersonal trust mediated 
the link between the two types of self-evaluation and support for democracy. In both studies, we 
aimed to include at least 400 participants, which gave us a power of .80 for detecting even small 
associations between variables (for r = .14; Cohen, 1988; G*Power yields a target of 395 
participants). Data for both studies are available at: https://osf.io/84amd/ 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we tested our basic hypothesis that support for democracy would be positively 
predicted by self-esteem and negatively by narcissism. We also accounted for potentially 
confounding effects of two broad ideological predispositions that are robustly related to political 
attitudes and behavior: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)²D³threat-driven motivation for 
collective security and social cohesion´6LEOH\	'XFNLWWS; Altemeyer, 1998) and 
social dominance orientation (SDO)²a general opposition to equality and preference for certain 
groups in the society dominating over others  (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Duckitt, 2001; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Meeusen & Dhont, 
2015; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Weber & Federico, 2007). In past research, endorsement of 
democratic values was negatively associated with RWA (Miklikowska, 2012; Shaffer & 
Hastings, 2004). Also, both RWA and SDO were associated with support for restrictions of civil 
liberties (e.g., Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005). Both of these traits have also been 
linked to narcissism. Narcissism tends to be positively associated with SDO (Cichocka et al., 




2017; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009) and 
negatively associated with RWA (especially once we account for SDO and self-esteem; 
Cichocka et al., 2017). Therefore, we aimed to show that the effects of self-esteem and 
narcissism on support for democracy would be observed over and above any effects of RWA and 
SDO.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. We used data from a 2016 survey of US residents. 
Respondents were recruited using the Prolific Academic platform. The survey was completed by 
407 participants, 182 women, 225 men, aged 18-70 (M=32.41, SD=11.84). Most participants 
reported having a university degree (n=238) and White (non-Hispanic) as their ethnicity (n=305). 
Mode family income for the study participants was between $50,000 and $59,999. Participants 
filled out measures of self-esteem, narcissism and support for democracy, as well as the two 
adjustment variables (RWA and SDO) among other variables1. 
Measures 
Support for democracy was measured with the eight item Democratic Support Scale 
(e.g., Magalhães, 2014). Participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagree with 
VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDV³'HPRFUDFLHVDUHLQGHFLVLYHDQGVTXDEEOHWRRPXFK´DQG³'HPRFUDFLHV
DUHQ¶WJRRGDWPDLQWDLQLQJRUGHU´XVLQJDVFDOHIURP strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree, 
Į M=5.04, SD=0.88. Higher mean scores indicate higher support for democracy. Magalhães 
                                                     
1
 This dataset was also used by Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh 
(2018). However, these authors focused on a different set of variables. Among other variables, 
the study included a short measure of personality traits (Rammstedt & John, 2007). Controlling 
for personality did not affect the pattern of results (please see the Supplement for details). 




(2014) differentiated three factors of diffused support for democracy. In Study 1 we identified 
two factors. Additional analyses separating the two factors are presented in the Supplement. 
Self-esteem was measured ZLWK5RVHQEHUJ¶VVHOI-esteem scale. Sample items 
LQFOXGH³,WDNHDSRVLWLYHDWWLWXGHWRZDUGP\VHOI´DQG³,IHHOWKDW,¶PDSHUVRQRIZRUWKDWOHDVW
RQDQHTXDOSODQHZLWKRWKHUV´Participants responded to 10 items on a scale from 1=strongly 
disagree to 4=strongly agreeĮ M=2.87, SD=0.65. Higher mean scores indicate higher 
self-esteem. 
Narcissism was measured with the short, six-item version of the NARQ questionnaire by 
Back and colleagues (2013), where participants rated statements representing narcissistic traits, 
for example, ³,GHVHUYHWREHVHHQDVDJUHDWSHUVRQDOLW\´RU ³,ZDQWP\ULYDOVWRIDLO´on a scale 
from 1= not at all like me to 6= very much like me, Į M=2.80, SD=0.86. Higher mean 
scores indicate higher narcissism. Separate analyses for the two NARQ subscales are reported in 
the Supplement. 
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) was measured using four items reflecting 
authoritarian submission and traditionalism from the scale by Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss and 
Heled (2010), also previously used by Dhont, Hodson and Leite (2016). The items were as 
follows: (1)³What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in 
XQLW\´ (2)³2EHGLHQFHDQGUHVSHFWIRUDXWKRULW\DUHthe most important values children should 
OHDUQ´, (3)³The old fashioned ways and old fashion values still show the best way to live.´
(4)³This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, sex, and 
pay more attention to family values.´. Participants were asked to respond on a scale from 1= 
extremely disagree to 7=extremely agree, Į M=3.07, SD=1.52. Higher mean scores indicate 
higher RWA. 




Social dominance orientation (SDO) was measured with the Short Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale by Pratto and colleagues (2013). The items reflect both opposition to equality 
and group-based dominance (Jost & Thompson, 2000): (1)³In setting priorities, we must 
consider all groups.´ (reverse coded), (2)³We should not push for group equality.´, (3)³*URXS
equality should be our ideal.´ (reverse coded), (4)³Superior groups should dominate inferior 
groups.´. Participants were asked to respond on a scale from 1= extremely oppose to 7=extremely 
favor, Į M=2.27, SD=1.24. Higher mean scores indicate higher SDO. 
Results 
Zero-order correlations. We first computed correlations between all continuous 
variables (see Table 1). In line with our predictions, support for democracy was negatively 
related to narcissism and positively related to self-esteem. Support for democracy was also 
negatively related to RWA and SDO. We also found a significant positive relationship between 
self-esteem and RWA, and significant positive relationships between narcissism and RWA as 
well as SDO2. Self-esteem was unrelated to narcissism in this sample.  
--- Table 1 --- 
Regression analysis. Second, we performed a stepwise hierarchical regression analysis 
to investigate the effects of both forms of self-evaluation on support for democracy. We 
investigated the effects of narcissism and self-esteem on support for democracy in Step 1, 
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 Cichocka and colleagues (2017) found RWA to be negatively associated with narcissism 
(especially when accounting for the overlaps between RWA and SDO, and between narcissism 
and self-esteem). This is likely because right-wing authoritarians value traditional social 
arrangements (Altemeyer, 1998), while narcissists have a strong need for uniqueness and non-
conformity (Raskin & Terry, 1988). We did not replicate this finding in our dataset±narcissism 
was positively correlated with RWA, and this effect remained significant even after controlling 
for SDO, and self-esteem. This could be due to a different measure of narcissism used in this 
study. 




controlling for demographics in Step 2 and RWA and SDO in Step 3 (Table 2). In this way, we 
were able to observe the effects of self-esteem and narcissism without controls (Step 1) and 
when controlling for additional variables (Steps 2 and 3). We found a significant positive effect 
of self-esteem and a significant negative effect of narcissism on support for democracy. 
--- Table 2 --- 
Discussion 
 
The results of Study 1 provided support for our hypotheses that self-esteem is positively 
related to support for democracy, whereas narcissism is negatively related to support for 
democracy. These results remained significant even after we controlled for basic demographics. 
Low support for democracy was also associated with higher RWA (as in past work by 
Miklikowska, 2012) as well as higher SDO. The latter association might be due to the low 
concern for civil liberties associated with SDO (Cohrs et al., 2005). Nevertheless, controlling for 
RWA and SDO did not affect the basic relationships between self-esteem and narcissism. 
Therefore, we did not include these variables in Study 2. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we aimed to replicate the pattern of results obtained in Study 1 in a different 
socio-political context. We conducted Study 2 in 2016 in Poland²a post-Communist country 
which is still in transition into full democracy and is considered by The Economist Intelligence 
Unit as a flawed democracy (EIU, 2016).3 As in Study 1, we hypothesized that support for 
democracy would be positively predicted by self-esteem and negatively predicted by narcissism. 
We additionally examined whether these effects may be accounted for by interpersonal trust. We 








predicted that self-esteem would predict increased interpersonal trust, which would further be 
associated with greater support for democracy. At the same time, we predicted that narcissism 
would predict decreased interpersonal trust, which would translate to lower support for 
democracy.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Study 2 was a paper and pencil survey, conducted among 
405 Polish speaking, Caucasian, respondents, 236 women, 163 men, 6 unknowns, aged 18-41 
(M=22.63, SD=4.16) recruited in a university library. Most participants (n=364) reported to be 
students. First, participants filled out measures of self-esteem and narcissism (counterbalanced)4. 
Next, they completed a measure of interpersonal trust and ended the survey with a measure of 
their support for democracy. 
Measures 
Support for democracy was measured as in Study 1 with the eight item Democratic 
Support Scale (Magalhães, 2014), with responses from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree, 
Į 6, M=5.08, SD=1.19. Higher mean scores indicate higher support for democracy. In Study 2, 
we identified only one factor for this scale (please see the Supplement for details). 
Self-esteem was measured similarly as in Study 1 ZLWK5RVHQEHUJ¶Vself-esteem 
scale (Polish adaptation: Dzwonkowska, Lachowicz-7DEDF]HN	àDJXQDZLWKUHVSRQVHV 
from 1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agreeĮ M=2.84, SD=0.47. Higher mean scores 
indicate higher self-esteem. 
                                                     
4 Presentation order did not moderate the effects. At the end of the study, we also measured 
personal control (Cichocka et al., 2018) for exploratory purposes associated with a different 
project.  




Narcissism was measured with a Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Hall, 
1979; 34-LWHP3ROLVKDGDSWDWLRQ%D]LĔVND	'UDW-Ruszczak, 2000), where participants rated 
statements representing narcissistic traits, for example³,DPJRLQJWREHDJUHDWSHUVRQ´RU³,
like to be the FHQWHURIDWWHQWLRQ´RQDVFDOHIURP1= not at all like me to 5= very much like me, 
Į , M=3.09, SD=0.56. Higher mean scores indicate higher narcissism. 
Interpersonal trust was measured using seven items (5yĪ\FND), for example, 
³0RVWSHRSOHFDQEHWUXVWHG´RU³,QJHQHUDOSHRSOHDUHLQKHUHQWO\JRRG´Participants were 
asked to rate their level of agreement to these items using responses ranging from 1= extremely 
disagree to 7=extremely agree, Į 90, M=3.86, SD=1.15. Higher mean scores indicate higher 
trust. 
Results 
Zero-order correlations. We first computed correlations between all continuous 
variables (see Table 3). Support for democracy was negatively correlated with narcissism but 
was not significantly correlated with self-esteem. Interpersonal trust was positively related to 
support for democracy and self-esteem, but it was not significantly associated with narcissism. 
--- Table 3 --- 
Regression analyses. We then tested the hypotheses that low narcissism and high self-
esteem will predict support for democracy, and that this relationship will be accounted for by 
interpersonal trust (Table 4).  
As in Study 1, in Step 1 we introduced self-esteem and narcissism as joint predictors of 
support for democracy. Although self-esteem alone was not correlated with support for 
democracy, when we accounted for the overlap between self-esteem and narcissism, non-
narcissistic self-evaluation became a significant positive predictor of support for democracy. 




This is indicative of a potential suppression effect, in which an effect of one predictor 
strengthens once the variance shared with another predictor is accounted for (Cichocka & 
Bilewicz, 2010; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017; Paulhus et al., 2004). We checked for a 
suppression effect of narcissism using bootstrapping with 10,000 re-samples in Mplus7 (Muthén 
& Muthén, 1998-2012). The suppressing effect of narcissism was significant, -0.18 with a 
bootstrap 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of -0.33 to -0.05, indicating that the positive 
effect of self-esteem on support for democracy strengthened when narcissism was included in the 
model5.    
--- Table 4 --- 
 In Step 2, age and gender were introduced into the model. Results indicated that older 
participants declared stronger support for democracy. The effects of self-esteem and narcissism 
remained significant. The suppression effect also remained significant once we controlled for 
demographics, indirect effect = -0.13 [-0.28, -0.004]. In the last step, we introduced interpersonal 
trust which proved to be a significant positive predictor of support for democracy. Still, we found 
a significant, albeit weaker, positive effect of self-esteem and negative effect of narcissism.  
To perform a full test of our hypotheses, we conducted path analysis in MPlus using 
bootstrapping to check for indirect effects of: (1) self-esteem and (2) narcissism as predictors 
(included in the model command) of support for democracy via interpersonal trust (Figure 1). 
First, we tested whether interpersonal trust mediated the path between self-esteem (controlled for 
narcissism) and support for democracy. The indirect positive effect of self-esteem on support for 
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 Note that we did not test for suppression effects in Study 1, because in that sample narcissism 
was not significantly correlated with self-esteem. This is likely because self-esteem tends to be 
positively associated with the Admiration, but negatively associated with Rivalry subscales of 
the NARQ (Back et al., 2013).  




democracy via interpersonal trust of 0.05 had a bootstrap 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
of 0.01 to 0.14. This effect remained significant once we controlled for demographics, indirect 
effect = 0.05 [0.01, 0.13]. Second, we tested whether interpersonal trust mediated the path 
between narcissism (controlled for self-esteem) and support for democracy. The indirect negative 
effect of narcissism on support for democracy via interpersonal trust was not significant, = -0.02 
[-0.07, 0.00], with the same effect when controlled for demographics. 
--- Figure 1 --- 
Discussion 
Study 2 corroborated the results of Study 1 in a context of a younger democracy (Poland). 
In Study 2, narcissism was significantly positively correlated with self-esteem, confirming past 
research that used the NPI (e.g., Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; cf. Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004). 
After we entered narcissism and self-esteem simultaneously into the regression model, we found 
opposite relationships between the two types of self-evaluation and support for democracy. 
Narcissism proved to be significantly negatively related to support for democracy. Although self-
esteem was not significantly correlated with support for democracy, it became a significant 
positive predictor once we accounted for the overlap between self-esteem and narcissism. This 
suggests that only the non-narcissistic, secure form of self-evaluation is associated with support 
for democracy. Mediation analyses further indicated that interpersonal trust partially accounted 
for the associations between non-narcissistic self-esteem and support for democracy. The effect 
of narcissism on lower support for democracy via decreased trust was weaker, and not 
significant.  




The primary objective of our studies was to elucidate the role of self-evaluation in 
support for democracy. Whereas classic theoretical analyses uniformly suggested that support for 
the democratic system should be stronger among people with higher feelings of self-worth, 
empirical studies provided only mixed support for this claim (sometimes self-evaluation 
appeared to be positively related; Sniderman, 1975; Sullivan et al., 1981; and sometimes 
unrelated to democratic support; Miklikowska, 2012; Shaffer & Hastings, 2004). We argued that 
this inconsistency was due to the fact that self-evaluation is not a unitary concept: it can be 
secure (i.e., non-narcissistic), or defensive (i.e., narcissistic). In two studies, conducted in the 
U.S. (Study 1) and Poland (Study 2), we demonstrated that whereas the former is positively 
related to support for democracy, the latter is negatively associated with support for democracy. 
A significant positive correlation between self-esteem and support for democracy was observed 
in Study 1 but not in Study 2 (compare Tables 1 and 3). However, when we entered narcissism 
and self-esteem simultaneously into our regression equation, both the secure self-evaluation 
(without the narcissistic component) and narcissistic self-evaluation emerged as significant, even 
if relatively weak, predictors of support for democracy²they were just working in opposite 
directions. In Study 1, we additionally found that these effects remained significant despite the 
inclusion of ideological predictors (such as SDO and RWA) in the model.  
In Study 2 we found that the effect of self-esteem on support for democracy was 
mediated by a degree of interpersonal trust. Thus, our findings shed light on how a positive, non-
defensive self-view is operating to bring about approval of democratic values: it is at least partly 
attributable to the fact that people with high secure self-evaluation are in general more likely to 
trust others. It seems probable that those with a secure self-evaluation would develop better 
social networks based on self-confidence, which might help foster mutual respect and lower 




VXVSLFLRQWRRWKHUV¶LQWHQWLRQV (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016). This deep psychological attitude 
might make them more confident about democratic organization of social life, based on openness 
WRRWKHUV¶YLHZVDQGRSLQLRQV(which are frequently different from their own; see also Putnam, 
1995). It is then plausible that people with high secure self-evaluation would be more tolerant of 
ideological diversity, and perhaps even of ideologically opposing political candidates. In essence, 
individuals high in secure self-evaluation are likely to have faith in their fellow citizens and their 
electoral choices. They are also likely to feel empowered to change the political system if they 
partake in the process. More importantly, they might attribute these efficiencies to others and 
come to believe that although the ruling party may represent an ideological opposition, the 
political system provides an avenue for restitution come next election season (Sniderman, 1975).  
These possibilities await further empirical evaluation. 
Those high in narcissism, in contrast, were less likely to support democracy. 
Interpersonal trust did not emerge as a mediator for this association. One reason could be that in 
this work we used scales which capture grandiose narcissism, rather than vulnerable narcissism 
which is linked to low feelings of self-worth, anxiety and distress (see Krizan & Herlache, 2018 
for a review). Research shows that vulnerable narcissism is more strongly associated with 
mistrust (Krizan & Johar, 2015). Thus, vulnerable narcissists may be the ones who are too 
anxious and insecure to trust or believe in others.  
It is then likely that grandiose narcissism predicted lower support for democracy due to 
other factors. These could include narcissistic competitiveness and feelings of superiority, which 
result in lower tolerance of diverse opinions6. Grandiose narcissists might be likely to exhibit 
                                                     
6 Exploratory analyses conducted separately for the admiration and rivalry subscales of the 
NARQ confirm that the negative link with support for democracy was stronger for the rivalry 




inflated confidence in their understanding of politics (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; Vitriol & Marsh, 
2018) and feel threatened by criticism and disagreement with their beliefs. Importantly, their 
motivations are likely to be different from those who might reject democracy if they perceive 
threats to the social order, such as right-wing authoritarians. Indeed, in Study 1 the effect of 
narcissism was observed over and above the effects of RWA. Finally, narcissists, relative to non-
QDUFLVVLVWVVHHPWRUHJDUGRWKHUV¶narcissistic traits in a positive way (Hart & Adams, 2014). 
Thus, another explanation for the observed relationship may be a narcissistic tendency to favor 
non-democratic political parties led by narcissistic individuals.   
Because our studies were correlational, they do not allow to establish causal relationships 
between the variables. Our approach assumes that the more basic personality traits predict 
broader opinions about the organization of the social world. Nevertheless, we could also consider 
the possibility that non-democratic political systems alter the way personality is functioning. 
When there is high injustice, inequality, or economic uncertainty, it seems at least plausible that 
some citizens would find their personal needs threatened.  Under these circumstances, they may 
become defensive about their self-worth (e.g., Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010). This may be 
associated with further rejection of democratic values and a growing acceptance of authoritarian 
political solutions. Still, we hope that our research helps clarify past inconsistencies and possibly 
offer a direction into how to better understand the psychological mechanisms driving support for 
democracy. Future research would do well to examine the causal pathways to the endorsement of 
democratic values as well as the ramifications of mass narcissism and mass self-esteem across 
nations for regime or party changes.  
                                                     
subscale, which measures narcissistic devaluation, supremacy and aggressiveness. Please see the 
Supplement for details. 
 




For the functioning of democracy, it seems useful to foster positive feelings of self-worth, 
but if those become narcissistic, they can threaten the democratic process. Although the jury is 
still out on whether the new generations are more narcissistic than the previous ones 
(Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2008; Twenge & Campbell, 2008; Twenge, Konrath, 
Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008; Wetzel et al., 2017), it is important to monitor how societal 
changes, including the developments of technology and social media, affect the self (Twenge, 
2017; see also Do social media threaten democracy?, 2017). In the end, these processes may 
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Table 1  
Zero-order Correlations between Continuous Variables (Study 1) 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Support for democracy -  
 
  
2. Self-esteem .16 
p = .001 
-   
3. Narcissism -.23 
p < .001 
.04 
p = .44 
-  
4. RWA -.24 
p < .001 
.13 
p = .01 
.26 
p < .001 
- 
5. SDO -.29 
p < .001 
.05 
p = .33 
.29 
p < .001 
.36 
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Table 2 
Regression for Narcissism and Self-Esteem Predicting Support for Democracy (Study 1) 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Variables B(SE) ȕ p B(SE) ȕ p B(SE) ȕ p 
Self-esteem 0.23(0.06) .17 <.001 0.16(0.07) .12 .02 0.17(0.07) .13 .01 
Narcissism -0.24(0.05) -.24 <.001 -0.26(0.05) -.26 <.001 -0.13(0.05) -.13 .01 
Age    0.004(0.004) .06 .28 0.01(0.004) .13 .01 
Gender (1=female, 0=male)    -0.02(0.08) -.01 .79 -0.11(0.08) -.06 .19 
Race (1=White, 0=other) 
Education 












Income    0.04(0.01) .14 .01 0.04(0.01) .16 .001 
RWA       -0.09(0.03) -.16 .001 
SDO       -0.18(0.04) -.25 <.001 
F 18.13 <.001 7.19 <.001 11.66 <.001 
R2adj .08 .10 .19 
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Table 3  
Zero-order Correlations between Continuous Variables (Study 2) 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 
1. Support for democracy -  
 
 
2. Self-esteem .08 
p = .12 
-  
3. Narcissism -.10 
p = .04 
.44 
p < .001 
- 
4. Interpersonal trust .13 
p = .01 
.15 
p = .003 
-.01 
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Table 4 
Regression for Narcissism, Self-Esteem and Interpersonal Trust Predicting Support for Democracy (Study 2) 
 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Variables B(SE) ȕ p B(SE) ȕ p B(SE) ȕ p 
Self-esteem 0.38(0.14) .15 .01 0.34(0.14) .14 .01 0.29(0.14) .11 .04 
Narcissism -0.34(0.12) -.16 .004 -0.26(0.12) -.12 .03 -0.23(0.12) -.11 .046 
Age    0.05(0.01) .16 .001 0.05(0.01) .16 .002 
Gender (1=female, 0=male)    0.21(0.12) .09 .08 0.21(0.12) .09 .08 
Interpersonal trust       0.11(0.05) .11 .03 
F 5.55 .004 6.01 <.001 5.84 <.001 
R2adj .02 .05 .06 
 










Figure 1 Caption 
 
Figure 1. The effects of individual narcissism and self-esteem on support for democracy via 
interpersonal trust (Study 2). The indirect effect of narcissism on support for democracy via 
interpersonal trust = -0.02 [-0.07 to 0.00]. The indirect effect of self-esteem on support for 
democracy via interpersonal trust = 0.05 [0.01 to 0.14]. Entries are standardized coefficients, 
without controlling for demographics.  
+


















 Study 1 Additional Analyses  
Factor analysis 
We conducted a principal component analysis for the eight-item Democratic Support 
Scale (Magalhães, 2014) using oblique rotation (oblimin). In Study 1, the KMO=.79, 
indicating acceptable sampling adequacy. Two factors had eigenvalues higher than 1, and in 
combination explained 55.27% of the variance (see Table S1 for factor loadings). Of the 
factors suggested by Magalhães (2014), Factor 1 captured democratic performance evaluation 
and explicit support for democracy, while Factor 2 captured democracy-autocracy preference.  
Table S1 
Results of Factor Analysis for Democratic Support Scale (Study 1) 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
1. Democracies are indecisive and squabble too much. (r) .64 .19 
2. In democracy, the economic system runs badly. (r) .73 .11 
3. Democracies aren't good at maintaining order. (r) .76 .16 
4. Having experts, not congress, make decisions according to what 
they think is better for the country. (r) 
.11 .58 
5. Having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with congress 
and elections is needed. (r) 
.02 .81 
6. The military should govern in this country. (r) -.06 .75 
7. We should have a democratic based political system. .74 -.02 
8. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other 
form of government. 
.75 -.23 
Eigenvalues 3.14 1.29 
% of variance 39.18% 16.08% 




Note. Factor loadings over .40 in bold. The reverse coded items (r) were recoded prior to the 
analysis so that the higher scores indicate the higher support for democracy.  
 We repeated our basic regression analyses for the two components of support for 
democracy (Table S2). We found that the results for the democratic performance evaluation 
and explicit support for democracy were consistent with our basic findings ± they were 
negatively predicted by narcissism and positively by self-esteem. Narcissism also negatively 
predicted preference for democracy over autocracy, while self-esteem was not significantly 
associated with this outcome.  
Table S2 
Regression for Narcissism and Self-Esteem Predicting Two Components of Support for 
Democracy (Study 1) 
 Democratic performance evaluation/       
explicit support for democracy 
Democracy over autocracy 
preference 
Predictors B SE ȕ p B SE ȕ p 
Self-Esteem 0.30 0.08 .19 <.001 0.10 0.08 .07 .16 
Narcissism -0.16 0.06 -.13 .01 -0.38 0.06 -.32 <.001 
F 10.69 <.001` 23.14 <.001 
R2adj .05 .10 
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Analysis including the two NARQ subscales 
 We also conducted analyses for the two subscales of the NARQ questionnaire: admiration 
and rivalry (Table S3). Lower support for democracy was more strongly predicted by the rivalry 
aspect of narcissism, which is consistent with the theoretical rationale that narcissists are 
especially likely to reject democracy due to their competitiveness and the tendency to devalue 
RWKHUV¶RSLQLRQV 
Table S3 
Regression for the Two Subscales of Narcissism and Self-Esteem Predicting Support for 
Democracy (Study 1) 
Predictors B SE ȕ p 
Self-Esteem 0.19 0.07 .14 .01 
Admiration -0.08 0.05 -.10 .08 
Rivarly -0.17 0.05 -.19 .001 
F 12.50 <.001 
R2adj .08 
 
Analysis including personality traits 
Study 1 also included a measure of personality dimensions based on the Big Five model 
(McCrae & Costa, 1999) with the use of BFI-10 questionnaire (Rammstedt & John, 2010). Each 
of the five personality dimensions was measured using two items (scale from 1=disagree 
strongly to 5=agree strongly). However, there was a mistake in the text of one of the two items 
measuring Openness, and ± as a result ± we were forced to rely on just one item for assessing this 




personality trait. Because of this mistake, we decided not to include this analysis in the main text 
of the manuscript.  
We conducted multiple regression analysis to investigate the effects of self-esteem and 
narcissism on support for democracy when controlled for the Big Five personality dimensions: 
ExtraveUVLRQĮ M = 2.63, SD  1HXURWLFLVPĮ  .76, M = 2.93, SD = 1.19), 
$JUHHDEOHQHVVĮ M = 3.35, SD = 0.94), &RQVFLHQWLRXVQHVVĮ M = 3.75, SD = 0.94) 
and Openness (M = 4.07, SD = 1.00; Table S4).  
Our results indicated that participants who scored higher on the Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism dimensions also declared stronger support for democracy. In line with past work by 
Miklikowska (2012), the effect of trait Openness was significant, but its reliability is hard to 
assess, as the score for Openness is based on only one item. The effects of self-esteem and 
narcissism remained significant. 
Table S4 
Regression for Self-esteem, Narcissism, and Personality Traits on Support for Democracy (Study 
1) 
 Step 1 
Predictors B SE ȕ p 
Extraversion -0.01 0.04 -.02 .746 
Neuroticism 0.09 0.04 .13 .033 
Agreeableness -0.01 0.05 -.01 .872 
Conscientiousness 0.11 0.05 .12 .038 
Openness 0.13 0.04 .14 .003 
Self-esteem 0.23 0.09 .17 .007 




Narcissism -0.24 0.05 -.24 <.001 
F 7.90 <.001 
R2adj .11 
 
Study 2 Additional Analyses 
Factor analysis 
We conducted a principal component analysis for the eight-item Democratic Support 
Scale (Magalhães, 2014) using oblique rotation (oblimin). In Study 2, the KMO=.85, indicating 
acceptable sampling adequacy. Only one factor had an eigenvalue higher than 1 (4.11), and 
explained 51.32% of the variance. This analysis suggests that in Poland the measure captured 
general support for democracy.  
  
 
 
 
